Robert G. Garland and Mary Garland v. Floyd J. Rigby, Ray Hall, Rimaras Inc., and Anna R. Fleischmann : Petition for Rehearing by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1988
Robert G. Garland and Mary Garland v. Floyd J.
Rigby, Ray Hall, Rimaras Inc., and Anna R.
Fleischmann : Petition for Rehearing
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Michael W. Park; The Park Firm.
Patrick H. Fenton; Attorney for Appellant.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Garland v. Rigby and Fleischmann, No. 880707 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1475
BttitEF 
,LS 
DC CUstfEMT 
50 
DOCKET NO. „.> ^ /Cx ' 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBERT G. GARLAND and 
MARY GARLAND, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
FLOYD J. RIGBY, RAY HALL, 
RIMARAS INC., a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendants. 
and 
ANNA R. FLEISCHMANN, 
Defendant-Appellant 
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THE PARK FIRM 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBERT G. GARLAND and 
MARY GARLAND, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
FLOYD J. RIGBY, RAY HALL, 
R1MARAS, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendants, 
and : 
ANNA R. FLE1SCHMANN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 88070-CA 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss: 
County of Iron ) 
It is hereby certified as follows: 
1. That my name is Patrick II. Fenton; that 1 am an 
attorney of good standing with the Utah State Bar and am the 
attorney for the Defendant-Appellant in the above-entitled matter. 
2. I further certified that this Petition is presented 
in good faith and not for delay or for any other improper purpose. 
DATED this ; - day of September, 1989. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case was tried before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, 
District Judge, in Garfield County, Utah; the Defendant saw fit 
to take appeal from her position. 
This matter was appealled to the Utah State Supreme 
Court pursuant to statute; it was remanded by the Utah State 
Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals for appeal purposes. 
Plaintiff*s complaint was based upon a claim of adverse possession. 
Defendant's claim was based upon a judgment sale and being the 
person in line of title and entitled to the property. The 
Plaintiff claimed purchase of another lot and then a verbal change 
to the property that this item is about between himself and 
people not in the chain of title, to-wit: Rigby and Hall. The 
Defendant took judgment against the Defendant Rimaras, Inc. in 
Iron County, Utah, and had the same filed in the District Court 
of Garfield County, Utah, in which the land in question was 
situated in July, 1985. At that time, the Plaintiff established 
a lien on all property of Rimaras, Inc. 
The Court of Appeals by panel in Cedar City, Utah, heard 
this item on the 17th day of August, 1989. The decision was the 
1st day of September, 1989. 
At the time of receipt of the decision of the Utah 
Court of Appeals, the undersigned was attending the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals Judicial Conference in Santa Fe, New Mexico, and 
did not actually become aware of said decision until September 11, 
1989. At such time, he filed a stipulation and a motion for 
extension of time to file a Petition for Rehearing. He has not 
been advised of the action of the Utah Court of Appeals on his 
motion and is proceeding to prepare and file a Petition for 
Rehearing on the assumption that said motion for extension of 
time, where it has been stipulated to by counsel, will be granted. 
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
THIS ITEM WAS PLED AND TRIED ON AN ADVERSE 
POSSESSION CASE. THE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
FOUND THAT THERE WAS NO ADVERSE POSSESSION 
BUT THE COURT HAS UPHELD A DECISION BASED 
UPON ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
In the case of Day v. Steele, 111 Utah 481, 184 P.2d 
216, which was also an adverse possession case, upon continued 
reading to be against the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
in this Garland case rather than for it although it was used by 
the Utah Court of Appeals to justify its decision. In the Day 
case, the trial court found that there was adverse possession; 
the judgment of the trial court was reversed and the rights of 
the record holder were endorsed by the Utah Supreme Court. In 
the opinion of the undersigned, the Day v. Steele case is 
specifically an endorsement of the position of Miss Fleischmann 
who is the successor by virtue of a judgment sale to the rights 
of Rimaras, Inc. which was the Corporation that was sold out. 
Attention is invited to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law of Judge Tibbs, attachment, Item I of Defendant-AppellantTs 
initial Brief, where there was specific findings that there was 
adverse possession. The conclusion of law found by Judge Tibbs 
is as follows, "Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the 
Court concludes that the Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment 
quieting title to said property in favor of Plaintiffs and 
against the Defendants Anna R. Fleischmann, Rimaras, Inc., and 
Ray Hall." As part of the same attachment, Judge Tibbs quiets 
title in favor of Robert G. Garland and Mary Garland and against 
the other Defendants. 
The Utah Court of Appeals indicated that this position 
could not be maintained. In its majority opinion, in the Memorandum 
Decision, (Not for Publication), filed on September 1, 1989, the 
second sentence of the second paragraph commencing on page 2, 
which reads, nWe agree the trial courtTs order cannot be sustained 
uner a theory of adverse possession." And yet this is the way 
the trial court sustained it and was the conclusion of law based 
upon the findings of fact. Judge Tibbs did make such a conclusion 
of law; however, before he made it, he made the statement as the 
Utah Court of Appeals pointed out in the same paragraph, nYou 
havenT t even got it under adverse possession.ft Also, in the 
pleadings of the Plaintiffs Garland, in his complaint allege 
adverse possession, and there has been no motion to amend. So 
while we say that in Taubert v. Roberts, 747 P.2d 1046, that this 
is an action at law, in the second paragraph of page 3 of the 
Memorandum Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, there is a 
statement, !,Although the trial court's legal basis for quieting 
title in the Garlands rested on a theory of equity and fairness, 
which, without more, cannot be sustained" found that the theory 
cannot be sustained then certainly the judgment should be 
reversed. 
POINT II 
AT THE TIME OF THE AGREEMENT TO CHANGE TO 
LOT 128, THE PEOPLE INVOLVED DID NOT HAVE 
ANY INTEREST IN LOT 128. THE INTEREST OF 
RIMARAS, INC. WAS ACQUIRED THEREAFTER. 
UPHOLDING THIS AGREEMENT, UNDER THESE 
CONDITIONS, AS AGAINST THE PARTIES THAT 
KNEW NOTHING ABOUT IT AND THE SAME BE A 
VERBAL AGREEMENT, THIS IS A MISCARRIAGE 
OF JUSTICE. 
One must look carefully at the dates involved in these 
things as to where the rights came from if any. The Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, dated the 31st day of 
October, 1980, attached to both Defendant-Appellant's Brief 
and to Plaintiffs-Respondents1 Brief, in and of itself does not 
give any rights whatsoever in connection with Lot 128. As a 
result, the verbal agreement testified to by Mr. Garland became 
quite important. This is shown by Exhibits #2 and #3, which are 
included in Plaintiffs-Respondents' Brief, Exhibit #3 being 
included as an attachment in Defendant-Appellant's Brief, with 
the date thereof being very, very important. Exhibit #3 is a 
deed from Rigby and Hall to Lot 128, dated the 20th day of 
January, 1981, notarized on that date. Exhibit #2 is a letter 
of transmittal from Hall to Mr. Garland, dated the 20th day of 
January, 1981, transmitting a copy of that date, indicated that 
the original was being recorded. If it had been recorded on that 
date, it would have conveyed nothing. Mr. Garland testified 
that it was never recorded and that it did not show on the 
title. Conversation pertaining to Lot 128 must have taken place 
before this date. As of this date, all Rigby and Rimaras, Inc. 
have amounts to no interest in the lot in question. Mr. Garland 
relied upon this deed and assumed that it was recorded after 
having received the letter. See transcript of testimony, page 
14, line 3 to page 15, line 6. Although the deed was from Hall 
and Rigby and this was all he expected, he got what he expected 
at that time. Had the deed been recorded, it would not have 
changed anything; he still did not have the property. The only 
thing that was promised was a deed from Hall and Rigby. It was 
performed at that time, and there is no later agreement. There 
is some testimony under the direct examination of xMr. Park of his 
client, Mr. Garland reveals that any agreement pertaining to the 
change had to take place before the delivery of this deed and 
letter. The conversation that Mr. Park attempted to develop 
pertaining to when the change took place is found at page 11, line 
23, when he asked for testimony pertaining to the direct testimony 
of Mr. Garland. The reliance of Mr. Garland upon the deed from 
Hall and Rigby is set forth therein, and the conclusion was that 
this conversation had to take place before the 20th of January, 
1981, because of the dates on the letter and the deed. As of 
that date, neither Rigby or Hall or Rimaras, Inc. had any interest 
whatsoever in the property that is the subject matter of this 
lawsuit. This can be found conclusively upon the examination 
by Mr. Park of his client Mr. Garland on page 11, line 23 to 
page 12, line 9 of said transcript, which reads as follows,M 
MR. PARK: Q And did you subsequently have a 
question with Mr. Rigby or Mr. Hall about taking a different 
lot, rather than lot No.—ITm sorry—taking a different lot, 
taking lot No. 128. 
THE COURT: The question was is if you had a conversa-
tion with them about taking a different lot. 
WITNESS: A. Yes. I did. 
MR. PARK: Q. And when was that? 
A Oh, I don't know the exact date. Somewhere 
around this period of time. 
Q Somewhere prior to January 20, 1981? 
A Yes." 
Considering these questions, it is a fair conclusion 
that this conversation had to take place before the 20th of 
January, 1981 or else there is no point in Hall sending the 
deed and the letter. No one knows what happened to the original 
of the deed. 
ft is most revealing that neither Hall, Rigby or 
Rimaras, Inc. had any interest in Lot 128 at that time. 
At a later date in the trial, a Mr. Hatch was testify-
ing, and he was accepted by the Court as a title insurance expert. 
He was from Security Title Company of Southern Utah; he had 
prepared an abstract on this property. The entry of Exhibits 
10 and 11, which were the abstract being exhibit 10 and 11, and 
the sheriffTs deed which was made after the abstract, on page 
35, line 9 to page 36, line 15, there is discussion of the title 
of the property as a matter of record. It showed that in the 
1940s it was in a Mrs. Heline Jensen and then was transferred to 
a Mr. and Mrs. Allen. Apparently, upon the death of Mr. Allen 
and a recording of a waiver of lien from the State Tax Commission 
upon tiie riling oJ an affidavit and death certificate on the 
14th day of July, 1981, at which time there as a deed to Rimaras, 
Inc. from a Mrs. Warwick, wherein she stated that she had formerly 
been Mrs. Allen. It appeared that she was the survivor there. 
Mr. Hatch testilied that the only item thereafter that effected 
the title was the Sheriff's deed and the filing of the transcript 
of judgment in Garfield County District Court in July, 1985. On 
page 36, the Court requested Mr. Hatch to tell him what shape the 
title was in so that the Court would not have to read the trans-
cript. From page 36, line 17 to page 38, line 3, reads as follows: 
nTHE COURT: Wy don't you just tell me the chain while 
we're doing it. Just give me the chain. Run through the chain. 
MR. FENTON: All right, sir. We'll do that. 
THE COURT: It's rather difficult for me. I'd just 
have to sit and read the whole thing. 
MR. FENTON: Q. Mr. Hatch, you checked thjs back to 
about when, 1940? 
A Yes. 1 think that was when Mz. Jensen originally 
acquired it. 
Q An Mrs. Jensen deeded it to Mr. and Mrs. Allen? 
A That's correct. 
Q And Mr. Allen apparently died and Mr. Allen had a 
a tax waiver? 
A An affidavit—severence of the joint tenancy. 
0 Yes. 
A A waiver of lien from the State Tax Commission and 
a certificate, an affidavit filed. 
Q And then, as Mrs. Warwick, the same lady, deeded to 
Rimaras— 
THE COURT: Who is Mrs. Warwick? 
WITNESS: A She's formerly Mrs. Allen, Your Honor. 
MR. FENTON: She's formerly Mrs. Allen. That's when 
we get her into it. 
THE COURT: Ail right. So Allen deeded it to who? 
WITNESS: A To Rimaras, 
MR. FENTON: Q Rimaras. And what day was that? 
A That was July 14th, 1981. 
Q And there has been no transfer of title from that 
day to the presen time, except the Sheriff's Sale; is that 
correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q Now, does your information show when the Fleischmann 
judgment became of record in Garfield Count? 
A July 8th, 1985. 
From this information, we can only conclude that Rimaras 
took title to the property on the 14th day of July, 1981, which was 
after the deed from Hall, dated the 20th of January, 1981, which 
had had it been delivered, conveyed nothing. It appears that on 
the date of the 20th of January, 1981, Rigby and Hall attempted 
to make a conveyance. The contract was completed even though 
they had nothing to convey, and Mrs. Warwick apparently owned the 
property according to the testimony of Mr. Hatch, and the items 
that affected the title record of the property was the filing of 
the judgment lien in Garfield County of the Defendant-Appellant 
Ms. Fleischmann and the SheriffTs Sale. It does appear that 
in someway there were negotiations later wherein Hall and Rigby 
and Mr. Garland and Rimaras, Inc. conveyed, apparently Exhibit #4 
attached to Plaintiffs-Respondents' Brief. Exhibit #15, attached 
to Defendant-Appellant's Reply Brief showed that at that time 
there were negotiations to get the title from Rimaras, Inc. to 
Mr. Garland long after the filing of the lien in July, 1985. 
POINT III 
THE PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS DID RELY UPON ADVERSE 
POSSESSION 
Not only is the complaint based upon adverse possession, 
the conclusion of law of Judge Tibbs recites adverse possession, 
and the judgment is in reliance thereon. Page 60 of the transcript, 
line 7, Mr. Park made the statement, MWe do have the property, 
possession.M The Court said on the same page, lines 3 and 4, 
"Your client's still got the property•" The Court was speaking 
to Mr. Park. 
POINT IV 
THERE WAS NO POINT IN RIMARAS, INC. IN ANSWERING. 
BY THE TIME THIS MATTER WAS TRIED, RIMARASf TIME 
FOR REDEMPTION ON THE PROPERTY HAD EXPIRED AND 
THE SHERIFF HAD ISSUED THE DEED, WHATEVER INTEREST 
RIMARAS HAD WAS GONE. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, 
IT WOULD BE RIDICULOUS TO MAKE AN ANSWER AND 
PARTICIPATE IN THIS MATTER. 
The deeds from Rimaras, Inc. since the time of trial 
bring up questions pertaining to good faith. Rimaras, Inc. did 
not answer, and it was represented at the time of trial by counsel 
who did not participate in the trial because of bifurcated and 
the title item was to be tried first, with the fraud item to be 
tried at a later date. In all probability, there was fraud in 
the matter. If so, Rigby had filed an answer per se and was not 
on notice of trial. What the Court asked for was from Rigby. 
There was still pending a fraud item as against Rimaras, Inc., 
Hall and Rigby. This has since been dismissed. Under those 
conditions, there is no question that there has been some trading 
done since the trial. The claim of fraud has been dismissed. 
Rimaras, Inc. has furnished a deed post trial. Post-trial items 
should not be considered in an appellate matter of this nature; 
they have been considered by the Utah Court of Appeals and are 
mentioned in the Memorandum Decision. Under these conditions, i 
is proper to discuss them here. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT THE RECORD TITLE AT 
THE DAY OF THE HEARING WAS IN THE NAME OF MISS 
FLEISCHMANN AND THAT THE ACTUAL POSSESSION OF 
THE PROPERTY WAS IN THE PLAINTIFFS 
This shows that the trial courtTs decision was based 
upon possession and adverse possession which the Utah Court of 
Appeals has held otherwise and has found otherwise, but still 
upholds the decision. There is no question that this is an 
equity decision regardless of what the court says. See page 
64, line 12 to line 19 inclusive of the transcript, which reads: 
MThe Court further finds and concludes that 
judgment should be awarded in for of the 
Plaintiff quieting title against Anna R. 
Fleischmann. The Court likewise finds to 
hold otherwise would in essence so shock 
the Court that the idea of giving Mrs. 
Fleischmann the parcel of real property 
with the cabin on it, the Court in all equity 
and fairness just couldn't do it and that is 
the basis of the CourtTs decision. So the 
Court finds against the Defendant." 
Under these conditions, there is no question that 
the trial court found its decision based on adverse posession. 
The thought of the loss was the justification. There is no 
question that the Utah Court of Appeals has found that there 
was not adverse possession and has found exactly as the trial 
court for the Plaintiffs-Respondents because of the loss they 
were facing. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion from the above and foregoing, it is 
concluded that the trial court found adverse possession in the 
Plaintiffs-Respondents Garland and found under the Lach v. 
Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802, and decided the other way by the 
same Judge with a much different fact situation, that specifically 
objected to the Kartchern v. State Tax Commission case which he 
had failed to follow in the Lach case, being filed at 4 Utah 2d 
382, 294 P.2d 790, which agreed with the Kartchern case. He 
made the statement, "While I disagree with this reversal on 
the Kartchern case, I think the trial judge was correct.M This 
may be found on page 52, lines 18 and 19 of the transcript of 
the trial of this matter. 
Taking into consideration, that this matter should 
be rgversed and the Sherifffs Sale upheld. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that the above-entitled 
Court reconsider this item and reverse the decision of the 
trial court and put the title to the subject property in the 
name of Anna R. Fleischmann. 
DATED this / S day of September, 1989. 
Respectfully submitted, / 
PATRICK H. FENTON 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered on the 
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